States utilise international law to create opportunities within global markets for private transnational economic actors, such as multinational oil companies, to invest and/or operate within foreign jurisdictions. However, there is a lack of directly enforceable international mechanisms against these private actors when they cause environmental damage abroad. International law responses to this problem range from the establishment of international compulsory compensation schemes, the
Introduction
This essay explores the continuing legal issues arising from the non-compliance of environmental protection standards by private transnational economic actors operating beyond the national jurisdiction from which they originate. The focus here is on the activities of the multinational oil industry. This species of private transnational economic actors is taking advantage of increased opportunities to trade and especially, to invest within different national jurisdictions, following the success of world-wide efforts at trade liberalization and investment protection, established through international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 1 the Energy Charter treaty, 2 as well as bilateral investment protection treaties (known as BITs).
States have used international law to intervene within global markets and create opportunities for private transnational economic actors, such as multinational oil companies, to invest and/or operate within foreign jurisdictions. However, when domestic environmental protection standards are not complied with by these private actors, the lack of international mechanisms that are directly enforceable against these 3 private transnational economic actors means that States have to re-intervene to regulate, or otherwise hold these actors accountable for their non-compliance of these standards. International law responses to such non-compliance range from the establishment of international compulsory compensation schemes, the proposed expansion of the doctrine of State responsibility to include liability for private actors and more recently, through litigation in the home States of these multinational oil companies. However, domestic case law from the USA, Netherlands and the UK reveals a general ambivalence towards holding such private transnational economic actors accountable in their home State jurisdictions for violations committed abroad.
Jurisprudence from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) also exhibits a reluctance to hold private actors directly accountable to public international law.
Certain States (the USA and France) have responded to this ambivalence at the international level by reasserting their domestic regulatory power to require immediate clean-up and compensation, prior to domestic judicial litigation, whereas other States (such as Nigeria) are unable to achieve the same level of effective enforcement against the multinational oil companies operating within their jurisdictions due to their weaker political and economic bargaining positions. As we will see below in the Deepwater Horizon and Erika case studies, international 'best practice' for the clean-up, remediation and compensation for oil spills were 'enforced' against the multinational oil companies involved, namely, BP, Shell and Total, even prior to any domestic judicial finding of liability. This is in stark contrast to the jurisdictional and enforcement difficulties encountered when attempting to ensure clean-up and compensation for oil pollution in the Niger Delta region, at least in part attributed to omissions by Shell (Nigeria). The relative negotiating strengths of the 4 host State governments involved, namely, the US (Deepwater), France (Erika) and Nigeria (Niger Delta) clearly played a part in the different response levels by the multinational oil companies implicated in each of these case studies. This disparity is especially evident in the pro-active BP and Total responses in the US and France, respectively, as compared with the paucity of the Shell response in Nigeria.
Part I of this essay will first outline the different international and domestic legal means utilised to render these private transnational economic actors accountable, responsible and even liable, for their non-compliance of domestic environmental protection standards abroad. The international regimes established for these purposes, alongside the ambivalent results of both international case law and domestic cases from the USA, Netherlands and UK jurisdictions, will then be assessed. In Part II, the legal implications of an altogether more forceful approach taken by certain States (the USA and France) against the private transnational economic actors involved will be considered. Finally, this paper will conclude by reflecting on the viability of the different legal approaches towards rendering private transnational economic actors responsible for the environmental damage caused by their activities beyond their home State jurisdictions, in light of the forceful regulatory intervention that is still available and sometimes utilized by States.
Key to the arguments presented here is the need to recognize both the initial sense of legitimate expectation, but also more recently, the notion of social obligation that now underpins the legal relationships between private transnational economic actors and both the States they originate from and operate within. Previously, this sense of legitimate expectation manifested itself in arguments for the recognition of such private transnational economic actors as legal persons with enforceable rights against States, especially in the field of investment protection. More recently, the initial sense of legitimate expectation of investment protection on the part of these private economic actors has also translated into a growing sense of common obligations, accountability, and ultimately, even acceptance of responsibility on the part of these actors for their actions or omissions, where these do not accord with accepted human rights and/or environmental protection standards. However, such acceptance of corporate responsibility is usually voluntary on the part of the multinational oil company involved, rather than the result of the effective enforcement of these international norms within the domestic jurisdictions where these companies operate.
These ground-breaking legal developments are also taking place against a backdrop of unprecedented questioning of the role of the State in the political economic sphere within which these private transnational economic actors operate. In particular, the regulatory and enforcement roles of the State within their municipal and international legal frameworks are under scrutiny as never before, even in areas that were traditionally within the domain of States. While the regulatory role of the State is being questioned, alternative governance frameworks for holding private transnational economic actors legally accountable for their activities both at home and abroad have not necessarily been effective. Thus, individual States have retained their interventionist and regulatory roles over private transnational actors licensed to undertake economic activities deemed to be of significant State interest, such as the petroleum industry. In these situations, it is the relative strength of the regulatory power exerted by the host States that ultimately tips the balance either towards or against voluntary compliance by the multinational oil company involved.
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International However, the foundational Ruggie Principle on this issue appears to limit access to such remedies only to situations '… when such abuses occur within their territory and/or jurisdiction …' 6 , thereby arguably negating the possibility of access to domestic remedies for abuses committed by businesses abroad.
The second regulatory means utilized in this context is through the institutional networks established by the above international organizations both across and within national jurisdictions aimed at rendering private economic actors that originate from those jurisdictions accountable for their risky human rights and environmental practices. These institutionalized accountability networks are beginning to make an impact on multinational oil industry activities, especially through the concerted efforts of civil society groups utilizing these networks. A recent example of both these normative and networking developments is the utilization by Amnesty International Chamber went on to state that '(t)his means that the sponsoring State's liability arises not from a failure of a private entity but rather from its own failure to carry out its own responsibilities. In order for the sponsoring State's liability to arise, it is necessary to establish that there is damage and that the damage was a result of the sponsoring conceptually and practically similar to that which is already in place for tanker oil spill pollution compensation and liability for nuclear power generation accidents. While the Chamber does not elaborate on which of the entities concerned -whether the sponsoring States, or their licensees, or both -should contribute towards this trust fund, this option does allow for the possibility that the private economic actors undertaking deep sea-bed activities will be included within the proposed trust fund.
These private economic actors will thus be captured by public international law in line with the risks their activities pose to the fragile deep sea-bed environment that is subject to the 'common heritage of mankind' principle.
C. Litigation by Niger Delta Communities before Domestic US, Netherlands and UK Courts
34 Para.183, ibid. Nigeria. 38 As Wuerth succinctly observes, '(o)n the facts of the case -the relevant conduct took place within the territory of a foreign sovereign, the claims did not "touch and concern" U.S. territory, and the foreign defendants had no more than a "corporate 25 view of these Dutch University academics was confirmed in the Akpan case. In a significant interlocutory judgment on its jurisdiction on 24 February 2010, 47 The
Hague district court unequivocally affirmed that 'the forum non conveniens restriction no longer plays any role in today's private international law.' 48 Moreover, The Hague district court found that it had jurisdiction over the claims against both corporate defendants, namely, the Shell subsidiary in Nigeria, and the Shell parent company in
The Netherlands, because of the close connection between both these entities, such that a joint hearing was justified for reasons of efficiency. 49 The Dutch court therefore dismissed Shell's arguments, concluding that it had jurisdiction over both SPDC and Royal Dutch Shell on these matters. 50 In passing, it should be noted that the court, and indeed the relevant Dutch and EU laws that it based its decision on jurisdiction in this case, may be said to be fulfilling Ruggie Principle 26, which calls for consideration of ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a denial of access to effective domestic judicial remedies for addressing business-related human rights abuses.
Following this determination on its jurisdiction, The Hague court then ruled that the applicable law in these proceedings would be Nigerian law, 51 However, while the court initially ruled in favour of the admissibility of the Dutch NGO's claims to defend environmental interests in Nigeria before the courts in the Netherlands, 57 it ultimately rejected the Dutch NGO's claims in substance because oil 52 Ibid., at para.4.10. 53 Ibid., at para.4.3. 54 Ibid., at para.4.11. 55 Ibid., at para.4.12. 56 Ibid. 62 Ibid., at para.4.29. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid.
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On the other hand, The Hague court held that it was fair, just and reasonable to rule that SPDC had a specific duty of care in respect of the people living in the vicinity of the oil wellhead, especially fishermen and farmers like Akpan, to take reasonable security measures against sabotage. 66 As an operator acting reasonably, SPDC could have properly secured the oil wellhead at relatively low cost, which would in turn have considerably reduced the risk of sabotage. This lead the court to the conclusion that in this specific case, SPDC had violated its duty of care in respect of Akpan and committed a specific tort of negligence. 67 These claims for compensation were initially lodged against both RDS and SPDC/Shell determined that it is the failure to protect/prevent the relevant oil wellhead/pipeline from acts of sabotage that cause oil spill damage that can give rise to liability on the part of the operating oil company.
II. State Re-intervention to Ensure Appropriate Corporate Responses to
Oil Spills: International 'Best Practice'?
Having outlined and assessed the legal challenges faced at both international and domestic jurisdiction levels in relation to asserting accountability for multinationmal oil companies operating on foreign jurisdictions, this next Part of this study will provide two examples of (host) State-induced corporate responses to oil spill clean-up, remediation and compensation. Significantly, these State 'enforcement' actions against two different, so-called 'super major' multinational oil companies took place prior to the ultimate domestic judicial decisions on their corporate liability for these major oil spills. These two examples: the BP/US and Total/French/EU responses to 75 Ibid.
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the Deepwater Horizon and Erika oil spills, respectively, arguably represent international 'best practice' in this field. They are detailed here as follows: France of international 'best practice' in corporate responsibility on the part of BP and Total, respectively, for the clean-up, remediation and compensation of environmental and other damages arising from oil spills, whether legally required to do so or not.
Finally, it remains to be seen whether the latest legal frontline that has been opened on this issue, namely, the cross-jurisdictional pursuit of the parent company, Royal Dutch Shell, through its subsidiary company, SPDC (Nigeria) in both Dutch and UK courts, will yield the requisite justice for the Niger Delta communities and its environment in the face of arguably decades of corporate misbehaviour in this region.
Despite the withdrawal of the forum non conveniens doctrine in the Akpan and Bodo
Community cases by The Hague district court and UK High Court, respectively, the continuing reluctance of both domestic courts (and international tribunals, such as the ITLOS) to ultimately extend international responsibility to private actors operating beyond their national jurisdictions is clear. In the same vein, the continuing absence of even suitable legal nomenclature denoting such responsibility for breaches of international norms by private actors is notable, in the sense that we still talk of 'State', responsibility for breaches of international law, as opposed to 'corporate' or 'individual' responsibility, apart from the imputation of individual criminal responsibility for war crimes. Within this context, enforcing responsibility and liability on the part of private economic actors operating transnationally across different national jurisdictions for their breaches of international norms must still be considered to be an aspiration rather than the reality.
